Abstract: Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the US military bases in the GCC states have evolved functionally from the dual containment of Iran and Iraq to the consolidation of its predominance in the Gulf region. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US readjustment of its military bases in the GCC states features two attributes. First, the task of the bases has transformed from fighting the Iraq War to the more complex and enduring tasks of maintaining the Gulf security, countering terrorists and containing Iran. Second, the major military base deployment has shifted from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, Bahrain and other GCC states, so a multi-faceted security mechanism under the US leadership has taken shape, which has overshadowed the Iranian-proposed collective security appeal. In Obama's presidency, the deployment of the US military bases in the GCC states has revealed five new and distinct features, i.e. the bases are extending geographically, diminishing in size, increasingly
2-9). The overseas military bases are by nature geographically and functionally an extension of one country's domestic military bases abroad.
I. The US Readjustment of Its Military Bases in the GCC States after the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks
The United States, located in the western hemisphere is geographically distant from the chessboard of Eurasia, the universally recognized power center. To overcome its geographical disadvantage and intensify its intervention in the peripheral affairs of
Eurasia as an off-shore balancer, the US has, for the past seven decades, depended on its overseas military bases to project its military power, exhibit its political resolve to roll back potential enemies and reveal its credibility of military commitment to its allies.
Contemporarily, five major US military base conglomerations have come into being, including the vital regions of Europe, Asia-Pacific regions, North America, the Caribbean region and the Middle East.
The US military bases in CCC countries are part of the grand deployment under the leadership of its Central Command. In the 21 st century, these bases are not static but dynamic. The last two decades can be divided into two periods, with 9/11 terrorist attacks as the watershed.
During the decades-long history before the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War, the US military presence in the Gulf region was mainly in the form of aircraft-carriers afloat in the offshore areas, and such aircraft carriers were interlinked with the sixth fleet in the Mediterranean Sea with a view to prevent the former Soviet Union from interfering in the Gulf's regional affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s, the UK instead of the US was the predominant power in the Gulf region with supreme military presence, and the US presence was quite limited to sporadic and temporary port-visits (Williams, 1968: 38-55) .
In 1968, Britain declared that it would withdraw all military forces from the east of the Suez Canal and terminate its mandate in the Persian Gulf which lasted over two centuries (Cottrell and Bray, 1978: 7-8) . In the early 1970s, although the US was ready to fill the vacuum of power in the region, President Richard Nixon hesitated to do that due to the rising Arab nationalism after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the US large-scale military presence in the region halted. Hence, during the whole Cold War era, the US military presence in the Persian Gulf revealed two features. First, it mainly relied on aircraft-carriers in the waters nearby instead of permanent military bases; second, its military bases were quite small and sporadic which had more political than military implications.
After the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis in 1990, the US military presence and bases in the Gulf region began to mushroom, which centered on Saudi Arabia together with other lesser powers in the GCC. This kind of posture of distribution came to an end after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as George W Bush's administration substantially First, the US military bases in the GCC states are expanding geographically. Here, "expansion" has dual meanings. On the one hand, the US military personnel have been distributed more evenly in the area; and on the other hand, the military bases themselves have been distributed more evenly in the region. Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US military bases in the GCC were concentrated in Saudi Arabia, the most powerful state in the GCC, flanked by three golden waters of the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, 2007: 163) . Despite its abundant oil reserve and unique role in the control of the regional sea power, the Saudi government is inherently vulnerable to both internal and external threats. It is a terrorist-torn Monarchy, and its ruling legitimacy is frequently challenged by both the internal and external Islamic radicals. To meet its security needs, the Saudi government was pragmatic and heavily depended on the US military bases which would undoubtedly neutralize the domestic and overseas radicals.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Saudi Arabia was regarded as the hotbed of terrorists, and the US military bases have spread to all the six GCC countries, and its military presence was in each of the member states. For instance, the headquarters of the US Central Command was moved from Saudi Arabia to Qatar in 2002, and Al Udeid air base was one of the largest bases abroad; Bahrain was the headquarters and the home port of the Fifth Fleet with as large as a 60-acre military base in Manama, the capital (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, 2007: 65-67) . During the Gulf War in 1991, Bahrain offered great support and acted as a "bridgehead" in the US military campaign (Blanche, 2002: 24) . After the Iraq War, the Fifth Fleet, which was stationed in the Persian Gulf, had one aircraft-carrier fleet, including one aircraft-carrier, six warships, one attack submarine, three amphibious ships and four anti-mine ships (Zhao, 2006: 33 (Blanche, 2005: 15) . In return, the US government offered $9.4 million military assistance to Oman in 2009, which amounted to as much as $20.27 million in 2010 (Katzman, 2009: June 29).
The US built military bases in UAE too in the early 21 st century.
UAE for a long time, has had an unresolved territorial dispute with Iran over the islands of Abu Musa and The Tunbs. Partly due to the GCC's weakness and reluctance to offer military aid, the UAE pinned a high expectation on the US and allowed the latter to build military bases there in the past decade (Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, 2007: 284) . On February 1, 2010, President Obama declared his intention to send the UAE a series of arms, including 80 F-16s and Patriot missiles as well as long-range anti-ballistic missiles.
Before the outbreak of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US military forces had mainly concentrated in Saudi Arabia, and as many as 334 thousand troops were stationed in the country during the Iraq War in 2003 (Cordesman & Wagner, 1996: 84) . In the early 21 st century, the US-Saudi relations went through ups and downs, forcing Bush's administration to seek other alternatives for its troops in the Gulf. Steadily, it withdrew 200 military aircrafts and other supporting troops, and the tiny forces remaining were only 500, mostly for training purposes. The rest of the transferred troops were redeployed in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE, and in Central Asian countries. As Hamad Bin Jassim Al-Thani, the Foreign Minister of Qatar put it, "we need the US force to stay here, and the US needs us too." (Jaffe, 2002: June 24) . On the eve of the Iraq War in 2003, Kuwait was the most resolute county in the GCC in supporting the US military campaign to topple Saddam's regime. The Kuwait government not only provided free fuel, but also allowed the US military force to occupy as large as one quarter of the nation's territory for military purposes (Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, 2007: 87-88) . During Moreover, it took $1.4 billion US in construction with advanced electronic facilities (Calder, 2007: 30 Fifth, the US military bases and facilities in the GCC states are increasingly interlinked. According to the changed regional security situation, the US government has integrated all its military facilities and garrisons in the Persian Gulf in function and task, so that it has become a network of containment. On the one hand, the US military bases in the GCC countries were centered in Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain and meanwhile they received subordinate support from the sites in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman to forge an "arc of containment" after the outbreak of the Iranian nuclear crisis (Winkler, 2007: 181-198) . On the other hand, during the Obama administration, the US military bases in GCC countries echoed those in Iraq, 
II. The Dynamics of the US Readjustment of Its Military Bases in the GCC Countries
The dynamics of the US readjustment of its military bases in the GCC countries are four-fold. The first is the change of the US national security strategy. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US designated Third, the evolution of the US-GCC members' bilateral relations also contributed to the readjustment of its military bases in the Persian Gulf. After the 9/11 incident, the US-Saudi relations worsened all of sudden, and Saudi Arabia was charged as the covert sponsor of terrorists in the world. Due to the bilateral discord, Saudi Arabia prohibited the US from using certain military facilities in the country, and the US air force command and communication centers were forced to move to Qatar. After the outbreak of the Iraq War, the US air force in Riyadh and Patriot missile troops eventually withdrew from Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the small-scale troops took only defensive and training tasks (Cordesman, 2004: 312-324) . From the Saudi perspective, the rise of domestic anti-Americanism, the emphasis on diplomatic independence as well as the practice of "power balance policy" eventually sabotaged the bases of US-Saudi special relations. As a result, the US had to rely on Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait for new bases (Perry and Yoshihara, 2004:12) .
Compared with Saudi Arabia, other GCC states seemed more "warm-hearted" in accepting the US military bases. On March 25, 2002, US President Bush designated Bahrain as a "major non-NATO ally" (Blanche, 2002: 24) , which was a new pro-US partner with Bahrain and Kuwait. In February 2003, Bahrain decided to allow the US to continue to use its air and navy bases, and the bilateral relations were pushed to a new height (Han, 2009: 179) . On the eve of the Iraq War, although
Qatar was against the war, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the Emir of the country reportedly told General Tommy Franks,
Commander-in-chief of the US Central Command that now the US could have an opportunity to salvage Iraqi people (Franks, 2004: 404) .
In addition to Qatar and Bahrain, the US also maintained a special relation with the UAE. Its airbase of al-Dhafra near Abu Dhabi was stationed with about 1500 US military personnel (Cloud, 2006: February 23). The airbase had a "Special Airborne Operation Center of Gulf", which functioned as the training center for allies' pilots (Sirak, 2004: 32-37) . Boasting the largest seaport of Dubai, UAE was stationed with as many as several hundred warships of various kinds, belittling the rest of the bases in GCC countries. In January 2008, President Bush visited UAE for the first time throughout the American history.
President Sheikh Khalifa of UAE remarked that his state was an important US partner in the war against terrorism, and that the UAE would be committed to maintaining the regional and world stability together with the US (Looney, 2009: 387) . 
III. Conclusion: Implications of the US Readjustment of Its Military Bases in the GCC States
Since the 1980s, the Persian Gulf has remained the heart of the Islamic world, but the GCC tried in vain to maintain regional peace and security several times due to the lack of its enforcement power, such as the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the Gulf War.
After the outbreak of the Gulf War, the Saudi government even disbanded the GCC troops in Hafr al Batin, symbolizing the failure of GCC integration in keeping regional security and portending the new beginning of the US deployment of armed force in Persian Gulf (Terrill, 2006: 45; 244) . The last two decades has witnessed a substantial readjustment of the US military bases in the GCC countries, which would inevitably exert a far-reaching impact on regional security pattern.
First, it would consolidate the US predominance in the Gulf security framework. In recent years, there have been three different ideas on the maintenance of Gulf security order: the first is a west-dominated security framework advocated by the US; the second is Shī'ah security framework advocated by Iran; and the third is Saudi-dominated GCC security framework advocated by the Arab countries. In 2005, the GCC quick response force was formally disbanded, and there was only one headquarters and one air force command system remaining in Saudi Arabia. Hence, the internal security mechanism of GCC was only symbolic instead of substantial (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, 2004: 11) . At present, the Gulf security framework is actually dominated by the US, resembling a pyramid planning to build a navy base at Djask (Fathi, 2008: October 28) . It can be predicted that big powers' everlasting rivalry and security competition would be fiercer in the Persian Gulf and the Arab Sea in the second decade of the 21 st century. Overseas military bases, as the means of power projection, will be of great significance in Persian Gulf security in the years to come.
